

# Test & Verifikation

Kim Guldstrand Larsen

Brian Nielsen

Arne Skou



# Plan for kursus

No.	Dat8	SW8	SP2	D4	C6	Lecture date	Lecture room	Exercise room	Lecturer	Slides	Subject
1.	x	x	x	x	x	2 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL	<a href="#">Introduction</a>	<a href="#">Introduction</a>
2.	x	x	x	x		9 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL	<a href="#">Modelling in UPPAAL</a>	<a href="#">Modelling in UPPAAL. Timed Automata.</a>
3.	x	x	x	x		16 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		<a href="#">Verification Engine and Options of UPPAAL</a>
4.	x	x	x			23 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		<a href="#">Modelling Exercise</a>
5.	x	x	x	x		2 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		<a href="#">Introduction to testing</a>
6.	x	x	x	x	x	9 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	ASk		Classical Test 1: ( <a href="#">Test case design teknikker I: Whitebox</a> + Coverage)
7.	x	x	x	x	x	16 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	ASk		Classical Test 2: <a href="#">Test case design teknikker II: Blackbox</a> + xUnit+integrationTest
						23 March !					BN away
8.	x	x	x	x		30 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		Model-Based Testing: (FSM based and OO test)
						6 April					Påske
9.	x	x	x	x		13 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		Model-Based Testing: (Online Realtime <a href="#">Uppaal TRON</a> )
15	x	x	x	x		20 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Guest		SW Test in Practice (TK-Validation)
10a.	x	x	x			27 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		<a href="#">Testing Exercise</a>

# Plan for kursus



No.	Dat8	SW8	SP2	D4	C6	Lecture date	Lecture room	Exercise room	Lecturer	Slides	Subject
						4 May					St. Fededag
11.	✘	✘				11 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Andrezej/Ulrik		<a href="#">VisualState I</a>
12.	✘	✘				18 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Andrezej/Ulrik		<a href="#">VisualState II</a>
13.	✘	✘				25 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL/Illum		Planning & Scheduling Uppaal CORA
14.	✘	✘					A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		Performance Modelling: <a href="#">Probabilistic Model Checking</a>
					✘	?			BN/Schiøler		?Test of Logical Circuits
					✘	?			BN/Schiøler		?Test & Verification of FPGA SW

# Plan

- Background
  - Research Group and Projects
- Why (and what) test and verification
- Model-based approach
  - Finite State Machines (review)
  - Interacting State Machines
- Verification=Model Checking (1st glance)
- Model-based Testing (1st glance)

# Research Profile

## *Distributed Systems & Semantics Unit*



Research Evaluation, Sæby, January 12, 2006

5

# BRICS Machine

*Basic Research in Computer Science, 1993-2006*



Aalborg

Aarhus


Other relevant projects

**ARTIST, AMETIST**

Kim G. Larsen

# Tools and BRICS

Semantics & Verification  
(DAT4)  
Every Thursday afternoon



# CSS

Center for Indlejrede Software Systemer





# CISS Structure

**IKT Virksomheder**

**MVTU**  
25.5 MDKK

**Nordjyllands Amt**  
**Aalborg Kommune**  
12 MDKK

Systemer  
ES Oldenburg  
ES Holland  
ARTIS

**AAU**  
12.75 MDKK

**Virksomheder**  
12.75 MDKK



**Institut for Datalogi**

**Institut for Elektroniske Systemer**

**BRICS@Aalborg**  
Modelling and Validation;  
Programming Languages;  
Software Engineering


**Distributed Real Time Systems**  
Control Theory;  
Real Time Systems;  
Networking.

**Embedded Systems**  
Communication;  
HW/SW  
Power Management

01010101

# Partners

- Aeromark
- Analog Devices
- Blip Systems
- Danfoss
- Ericsson Telebit
- ETI
- Exhausto
- FOSS
- GateHouse
- Grundfos
- IAR Systems
- MAN B&W
- Novo Nordisk
- Motorola
- Panasonic
- RTX Telecom
- S-Card
- Simrad
- Skov
- SpaceCom
- TK Systemtest
- TDC Totalløsninger
- Aalborg Industries





# CISS on the way

- Kick-start, 2001:  
**700.000** DKK  
Northern Jutland Region & City of Aalborg
- Jutland-Fun IT-initiative, 2002:
  - 25,5** mil. kr Ministry
  - 6** mil. kr North Jutland
  - 6** mil. kr Aalborg City
  - 12,75** mil. kr Companies
  - 12,75** mil. kr AAU
- **35** projects
- **20** CISS employees
- **25** CISS associated researcher at 3 different research groups at AAU.
- **50%** over budgetteret industrial financing
- **19** industrial Ph.D.'s initiated



# Focus Areas



# Focus Areas

Model based development

IT in automation

Intelligent sensor network

Embedded and RT OS

RT Java Lab

Resource Optimal Scheduling


Modeling  
Methods

HW/SW Co-design / Design Space Exploration

Embedded Security


Testing and Verification

Technology  
Tool



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# Local → Regional → **National**



## DaNES

- Danish Network for Intelligent Embedded Systems


- **PARTNERS**

CISS, IMM, MCI,  
PAJ Systemteknik  
GateHouse A/S  
ICE Power  
Skov A/S  
Terma A/S  
Novo Nordisk A/S  
IO Technologies

- **Funded** by Højteknologifonden



- **Budget**

63 MDKK / 4 years



Local → Regional → **National**

# DaNES




# Local → Regional → National → International

## ARTIST2

Network of Excellence

6,5MEuro, 32 partners




Testing & Verification  
CISS coordinator



EU's 7<sup>th</sup> Framework  
→  
ARTEMIS Research Platform  
→  
Centers of Excellence



# Hvorfor T&V ?



- Fejl i indlejret software forbundet med voldsomme udgifter.



Michael Williams  
Research Director, Ericsson,  
SE



very fast error recovery and reclaiming of allocated resources  
- If all else fails, very fast "node" restart and recovery  
• But most of all TEST, TEST, TEST, TEST

\*\*\* STOP: 0x0000000A (0x802aa502, 0x00000002, 0x00000000, 0xEA84001C)


IRQL\_NOT\_LESS\_OR\_EQUAL\*\*\* Address fa84001c has base at fa840000 - i8042prt.SYS

CPUID: GenuineIntel 5.2.c irql:1f SYSVER 0xF0000565

Dll Base	Date Stamp	Name	Dll Base	Date Stamp	Name
80100000	2be154c9	- ntoskrnl.exe	80400000	2bc153b0	- hal.dll
80200000	2bd49628	- ncr710.sys	8025c000	2bd49688	- SCSIPTORT.SYS
80267000	2bd49683	- scsidisk.sys	802a6000	2bd496b9	- Fastfat.sys
fa800000	2bd49666	- Floppy.SYS	fa810000	2bd496db	- Hpfs_Rec.SYS
fa820000	2bd49676	- Null.SYS	fa830000	2bd4965a	- Beep.SYS
fa840000	2bdaab00	- i8042prt.SYS	fa850000	2bd5a020	- SERMOUSE.SYS
fa860000	2bd4966f	- kbdclass.SYS	fa870000	2bd49671	- MOUCLASS.SYS
fa880000	2bd9c0be	- Videoprt.SYS	fa890000	2bd49638	- NCR77C22.SYS
fa8a0000	2bd4a4ce	- Vga.SYS	fa8b0000	2bd496d0	- Msfs.SYS
fa8c0000	2bd496c3	- Npfs.SYS	fa8e0000	2bd496c9	- Ntfs.SYS
fa940000	2bd496df	- NDIS.SYS	fa930000	2bd49707	- wlan.sys
fa970000	2bd49712	- TDI.SYS	fa950000	2bd5a7fb	- nbfs.sys
fa980000	2bd72406	- streams.sys	fa9b0000	2bd4975f	- ubnb.sys
fa9c0000	2bd5bfd7	- mcsxms.sys	fa9d0000	2bd4971d	- netbios.sys
fa9e0000	2bd49678	- Parallel.sys	fa9f0000	2bd4969f	- serial.SYS
faa00000	2bd49739	- mup.sys	faa40000	2bd4971f	- SMBTRSUP.SYS
faa10000	2bd6f2a2	- srv.sys	faa50000	2bd4971a	- afd.sys
faa60000	2bd6fd80	- rdr.sys	faaa0000	2bd49735	- browser.sys

Address	dword	dump	Build [1381]	Name
fe9cdaec	fa84003c	fa84003c	00000000 00000000	80149905 - i8042prt.SYS
fe9cdaf8	8025dfe0	8025dfe0	ff8e6b8c 80129c2c	ff8e6b94 - SCSIPTORT.SYS
fe9cdb10	8013e53a	8013e53a	ff8e6b94 00000000	ff8e6b94 - ntoskrnl.exe
fe9cdb18	8010a373	8010a373	ff8e6df4 ff8e6f60	ff8e6c58 - ntoskrnl.exe
fe9cdb38	80105683	80105683	ff8e6f60 ff8e6c3c	8015ac7e - ntoskrnl.exe
fe9cdb44	80104722	80104722	ff8e6df4 ff8e6f60	ff8e6c58 - ntoskrnl.exe
fe9cdb4c	8012034c	8012034c	00000000 80088000	80106fc0 - ntoskrnl.exe

# Hvorfor T&V ?



- Fejl i indlejret software forbundet med voldsomme udgifter.
- 30-40% af udviklingstid bruges på tidskrævende, ad-hoc aftestning.
- Potentialet for forbedrede metoder og værktøjer enormt.
- "Time-to-market" kan reducere betydeligt ved brug af tidlig verifikation og performanceanalyse





Michael Williams  
Research Director, Ericsson,  
SE



very fast error recovery and reclaiming of allocated resources  
- If all else fails, very fast "node" restart and recovery  
• But most of all TEST, TEST, TEST, TEST

# Verifikation og Test

Model



```

/* Wait for event...
void OS_Wait(void);

/* Operating system visualSTATE process. Mimics a OS process for a
 * visualSTATE system. In this implementation this is the main process
 * interfacing to the visualSTATE basic API. */
void OS_VS_Process(void);

/* Define completion...
unsigned char cc;

void HandleError(unsigned int ccArg)
{
    printf("Error code: %d\n", ccArg);
    exit(ccArg);
}

/* In d-241 we only use... to simulate a
 * system. Its purpose is to... how this is done is up to
 * you.
 */
void OS_Wait(void)
{
    /* Ignore the parameters; just retrieve events from the keyboard and
     * put them into the queue. When EVENT_UNDEFINED is read from the
     * keyboard, return to the calling process. */
    SEM_EVENT_TYPE event;
    int num;

```

• Verifikation  
**Kode/Model** mht **Spec**  
 • Test  
**System** mht **Model/Spec**



System

Kode


Kim G. Larsen

# Test versus Verifikation



Airbus Control Panel

E F E E G H ... H A



2<sup>n</sup> sekvenser af lgd n

Deadlock identificeret ved  
**VERIFIKATION**  
efter sekvens på  
2000  
telegrammer / < 1min

UPPAAL




Beolink

T1 T3 T5 T1 ... T4 T3

# Introducing, Detecting and Repairing Errors


*Liggesmeyer 98*

Analysis	Conceptual Design	Programming	Design Test	System Test	Operation
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# Introducing, Detecting and Repairing Errors

*Liggesmeyer 98*




# A very complex system



Klaus Havelund, NASA

# Rotterdam Storm Surge Barrier



# Spectacular software bugs

## Ariane 5

- The first Ariane 5 rocket was launched in June, 1996. It used software developed for the successful Ariane 4. The rocket carried two computers, providing a backup in case one computer failed during launch. Forty seconds into its maiden flight, the rocket veered off course and exploded. The rocket, along with \$500 million worth of satellites, was destroyed.
- Ariane 5 was a much more powerful rocket and generated forces that were larger than the computer could handle. Shortly after launch, it received an input value that was too large. The main and backup computers shut down, causing the rocket to veer off course.



# Spectacular software bugs

## U.S.S. Yorktown, U.S. Navy

- In 1998, the USS Yorktown became the first ship to test the US Navy's Smart Ship program. The Navy planned to use off-the-shelf computers and software instead of expensive U.S.S. Yorktown, courtesy of U.S. Navy custom-made machines. A sailor mistakenly entered a zero for a data value on a computer. Within minutes, Yorktown was dead in the water. It was several hours before the ship could move again.
- When the sailor entered the mistaken number, the computer tried to divide by zero, which isn't possible. The software didn't check to see if the inputs were valid before computing and generated an invalid answer that was used by another computer. The error cascaded several computers and eventually shut down the ship's engines.



*Kim G. Larsen*

# Spectacular software bugs

## Moon or Missiles

- The United States established the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) during the Cold War to detect a Soviet missile attack. On October 5, 1960 the BMEWS radar at Thule, Greenland detected something. Its computer control system decided the signal was made by hundreds of missiles



- The radar had actually detected the Moon rising over the horizon. Unfortunately, the BMEWS computer had not been programmed to understand what the moon looked like as it rose in the eastern sky, so it interpreted the huge signal as Soviet missiles. Luckily for all of us, the mistake was realized in time.

# Spectacular Software Bugs


.... continued

- INTEL Pentium II floating-point division  
470 Mill US \$
- Baggage handling system, Denver  
1.1 Mill US \$/day for 9 months
- Mars Pathfinder
- .....

# Spectacular software bugs

## Therac 25

- The Therac-25 radiation therapy machine was a medical device that used beams of electrons or photons to kill cancer cells. Between **1985-1987**, at least six people got very sick after Therac-25 treatments. Four of them died. The manufacturer was confident that their software made it impossible for the machine to harm patients.



- The Therac-25 was withdrawn from use after it was determined that it could deliver fatal overdoses under certain conditions. The software would shut down the machine before delivering an overdose, but the error messages it displayed were so unhelpful that operators couldn't tell what the error was, or how serious it was. In some cases, operators ignored the message completely:

"H-tilt"

"Malfunction 54"

IEEE Computer, Vol. 26, No. 7, July 1993, pp. 18-41

# More complex systems



# A simple program

```

int x=100;

Process INC
  do
    :: x<200 --> x:=x+1
  od

Process DEC
  do
    :: x>0 --> x:=x-1
  od

Process RESET
  do
    :: x=200 --> x:=0
  od

( INC || DEC || RESET )

```

Which values may  
x take ?

Questions/Properties:

$E \langle \rangle (x > 100)$

$E \langle \rangle (x > 200)$

$A [ ] (x \leq 200)$

$E \langle \rangle (x < 0)$

$A [ ] (x \geq 0)$

Possibly

Always

# Another simple program

What are the possible final values of x ?

```

int x=0;

Process P
  do
    x:=x+1
  10 times

( P || P )
  
```

```

int x=0;

Process P
  int r
  do
    r:=x; r++; x:=r
  10 times

( P || P )
  
```

**Atomic stm.**

# Yet another simple program

```

int x=1;

Process P
  do
    x:=x+x
  forever

( P || P )
  
```

What are the possible values that x may posses during execution?

```

int x=1;

Process P
  int r
  do
    r:=x; r:=x+r; x:=r
  forever

( P || P )
  
```

**Atomic stm.**

# Model-based Approach




# Suggested Solution?


## Model based

validation, verification and testing of  
software and hardware


# Verification & Validation




# Verification & Validation



# Verification & Validation




# Verification & Validation



How?

**Unified Model = State Machine!**

Input  
ports



Output  
ports

Control states





# Digital Watch








Fig. 20

# The SDL Editor

process MobileSt(1,1)




```

/* To store the SDL PID of the Base Tx Stations. Necessary
to send a signal to a given BTS. */
NEWTYPE BTS_PIDs_t
ARRAY(BTS_ID_t, PID);
ENDNEWTYPE;

DCL
me Mobile_ID_t, /* replaces context parameters.*/
IMEI IMEI_t, /* replaces context parameters.*/
p PIN_t,
status BOOLEAN,
senderBTS,
BTSreceived BTS_ID_t,
BTS_PIDs BTS_PIDs_t;
  
```

## Process level



```

SPIN CONTROL 3.1.3 -- 16 March 1998 -- File: p123
File.. Edit.. Run.. Help SPIN DESIGN VERIFICATION Line#: 18 Find:
mttype = { msg0, msg1, ack0, ack1 };
chan sender = [1] of { byte };
chan receiver = [1] of { byte };

proctype Sender()
{
  byte any;
again:
  do
    :: receiver!msg1;
    if
      :: sender?ack1 -> break
      :: sender?any /* lost */
      :: timeout /* retransmit */
    fi
  od;
  do
    :: receiver!msg0;
    if
      :: sender?ack0 -> break
      :: sender?any /* lost */
      :: timeout /* retransmit */
    fi
  od;
  goto again;
}

proctype Receiver()
{
  byte any;
again:
  do
    :: receiver?msg1 -> sender!ack1; break
    :: receiver?msg0 -> sender!ack0
    :: receiver?any /* lost */
  od;
  P0:
  do
    :: receiver?msg0 -> sender!ack0; break
  od;
}
  
```

<starting simulation>  
/pack/PS/Spin.prog/spin-3.13/bin/spin -X -p -v -g -l -s -r -t -j0 pan\_in  
<at end of trail>

```

) line 41 "pan_in" (state 16)
line 23 "pan_in" (state 16)
line 50 "pan_in" (state 4)

line 63 "never" (state 0) [printf('MSC:
line 63 "pan_in" (sta
  
```

Ghost View

```


Verification Output
warning: for p.o. reduction to be valid the never claim must be stutter-closed
(never claims generated from LTL formulae are stutter-closed)
pan: acceptance cycle (at depth 59)
pan: wrote pan_in.trail
(Spin Version 3.1.3 -- 16 March 1998)
Warning: Search not completed
+ Partial Order Reduction

Full statespace search for:
never-claim +
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim)
acceptance cycles + (fairness disabled)
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim)

State-vector 32 byte, depth reached 67, errors: 1
35 states, stored (41 visited)
6 states, matched
47 transitions (= visited+matched)
1 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
(max size 2^19 states)

2.542 memory usage (Mbyte)
  
```

Save in: p123.out Clear Close




# visualSTATE

VVS


w Baan Visualstate, DTU (CIT project)



- Hierarchical state systems
- Flat state systems
- Multiple and inter-related state machines
- Supports UML notation
- Device driver access



# Rhapsody



# ESTEREL

**Simulation Output**

Name	Value	Type
RingBell		
TILT		
GameOver		
Go		
Display	..*	integer
GameNormal.RemainingMe	..*	integer

All Outputs Locals Traps Variables Watch

**ReflexGameNormal.scg - ReflexGameNormal #0**


Code Coverage Help

100

Module

Abbrev

Prior



**Simulation Control**

Name	Value	Type
Coin		
On_off		
Ready		
Stop		
MS		


All Inputs Sensors Return Signals

Commands: Tick, Reset, Keep Inputs

Current Session: 1


Playback Session:  Reset on Loading

Dump control: Waveform, Output file, Configuration file, Coverage, Output file, Compact Coverage Files






# 'State Explosion' problem



M1 x M2




All combinations = exponential in no. of components

Provably theoretical intractable

# Train Simulator

1421 machines  
11102 transitions  
2981 inputs  
2667 outputs  
3204 local states  
Declare state sp.:  $10^{476}$


BUGS ?



Our techniques has reduced verification  
time with several orders of magnitude  
(ex 14 days to 6 sec)

# Modelling and Analysis

Software Model **A**



**Tools:** UPPAAL, visualSTATE,  
ESTEREL, SPIN, Statemate, FormalCheck,  
VeriSoft, Java Pathfinder,...

# Modelling and Analysis

BRICS

Software Model **A**

Semantics

Requirement **F**

Logic



Algorithmics

No!

Debugging Information

Yes,

Prototypes

Executable Code

Test sequences

**Tools:** UPPAAL, visualSTATE,  
ESTEREL, SPIN, Statemate, FormalCheck,  
VeriSoft, Java Pathfinder,...

**Most fundamental  
model in Computer Science:  
Kleene og Moore**

# Finite State Machines


- **Language versus behaviour**
- **Determinism versus non-determinism**
- **Composition and operations**
- **Variants of state machines**  
**Moore, Mealy, IO automater, UML ....**

# State Machines

## Model of Computation

- Set of states
- A **start** state
- An **input-alfabet**
- A **transition funktion**, mapping input symbols and state to next state
- One ore more **accept** states.
- **Computation** starts from start state with a given input string (read from left to right)

Modulo 3 counter



inc inc dec inc inc dec inc ☹️

inc inc dec inc dec inc dec inc 😊

input string


# State Machines

## Variants

Machines may have actions/output associated with state— Moore Machines.

inputstreng

inc inc dec inc inc dec inc



outputstreng

0 1 2 1 2 0 2 1

# State Machines

## Varianter


Machines may have **actions/output** associated with med transitions – **Mealy** Maskiner.

Transitions unconditional of af input (nul-transitions).

Several transitions for given for input and state (**non-determinisme**).

inputstreng

inc inc dec inc inc dec inc




outputstreng

1 2 1 2 0 2 1

# State Machines

## Variants

Symbols of alphabet partitioned in  
input- and output-actions  
(IO-automata)



0! 0! 0! inc? inc? 2! 2! dec? 1!



interaction

# Bankbokskode



- O
- B
- G

To open a bank box  
the code must contain at least 2 ●

To open a bank box  
the code must end with ● ● ●

To open a bank box  
the code must end with ● ● ●  
or with ● ● ●

To open a bank box  
the code must end with a palindrom

e.g.: ● ● ●  
● ● ● ●  
● ● ● ● ●

.....

# Fundamental Results

- Every FSM may be determinized accepting the same language (potential explosion in size).
- For each FSM there exist a language-equivalent *minimal* deterministic FSM.
- FSM's are closed under  $\cap$  and  $\cup$
- FSM's may be described as regular expressions (and vice versa)



# Interacting State Machines

# Home-Banking?

```
int accountA, accountB; //Shared global variables
//Two concurrent bank costumers
```

```
Thread costumer1 () {
    int a,b; //local tmp copy


    a=accountA;
    b=accountB;
    a=a-10;b=b+10;
    accountA=a;
    accountB=b;
}
```

```
Thread costumer2 () {
    int a,b;

    a=accountA;
    b=accountB;
    a=a-20; b=b+20;
    accountA=a;
    accountB=b;
}
```

❖ Are the accounts in balance after the transactions?

# Home Banking



$A[]$  (pc1.finished and pc2.finished) imply (accountA+accountB==200)?

# Home Banking

```
int accountA, accountB; //Shared global variables
Semaphore A,B;          //Protected by sem A,B
//Two concurrent bank costumers
```

```
Thread costumer1 () {
    int a,b; //local tmp copy
```

```
    wait(A);
    wait(B);
    a=accountA;
    b=accountB;
    a=a-10;b=b+10;
    accountA=a;
    accountB=b;
    signal(A);
    signal(B);
```

```
}
```


```
Thread costumer2 () {
    int a,b;
```

```
    wait(B);
    wait(A);
    a=accountA;
    b=accountB;
    a=a-20; b=b+20;
    accountA=a;
    accountB=b;
    signal(B);
    signal(A);
```


```
}
```

# Semaphore FSM Model

Binary Semaphore




Counting Semaphore




# Composition

*IO Automater (2-vejs synkronisering)*





# Composition

## *IO Automater*



# Semaphore Solution?



1. Consistency? (Balance)
2. Race conditions?
3. Deadlock?

1.  $A[]$  (mc1.finished and mc2.finished) imply (accountA+accountB==200)
2.  $E \langle \rangle$  mc1.critical\_section and mc2.critical\_section
3.  $A[]$  not (mc1.finished and mc2.finished) imply not deadlock



# Plan for kursus

No.	Dat8	SW8	SP2	D4	C6	Lecture date	Lecture room	Exercise room	Lecturer	Slides	Subject
1.	x	x	x	x	x	2 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL	<a href="#">Introduction</a>	<a href="#">Introduction</a>
2.	x	x	x	x		9 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL	<a href="#">Modelling in UPPAAL</a>	<a href="#">Modelling in UPPAAL. Timed Automata.</a>
3.	x	x	x	x		16 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		<a href="#">Verification Engine and Options of UPPAAL</a>
4.	x	x	x			23 February	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		<a href="#">Modelling Exercise</a>
5.	x	x	x	x		2 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		<a href="#">Introduction to testing</a>
6.	x	x	x	x	x	9 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	ASk		Classical Test 1: ( <a href="#">Test case design teknikker I: Whitebox</a> + Coverage)
7.	x	x	x	x	x	16 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	ASk		Classical Test 2: <a href="#">Test case design teknikker II: Blackbox</a> + xUnit+integrationTest
						23 March !					BN away
8.	x	x	x	x		30 March	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		Model-Based Testing: ( <a href="#">FSM based and OO test</a> )
						6 April					Påske
9.	x	x	x	x		13 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		Model-Based Testing: (Online Realtime <a href="#">Uppaal TRON</a> )
15	x	x	x	x		20 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Guest		SW Test in Practice (TK-Validation)
10a.	x	x	x			27 April	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	BN		<a href="#">Testing Exercise</a>

# Plan for kursus

No.	Dat8	SW8	SP2	D4	C6	Lecture date	Lecture room	Exercise room	Lecturer	Slides	Subject
						4 May					St. Bededag
11.	✘	✘				11 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Andrezej/Ulrik		<a href="#">VisualState I</a>
12.	✘	✘				18 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	Andrezej/Ulrik		<a href="#">VisualState II</a>
13.	✘	✘				25 May	A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL/Illum		Planning & Scheduling Uppaal CORA
14.	✘	✘					A4-108 8.15-10.00	Group Rooms +PC-Lab: E1-110	KGL		Performance Modelling: <a href="#">Probabilistic Model Checking</a>
					✘	?			BN/Schiøler		?Test of Logical Circuits
					✘	?			BN/Schiøler		?Test & Verification of FPGA SW